Compatibilism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

I’m working on another paper about Harry Frankfurt’s thought. The paper is on Frankfurt’s counterexample to refute the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). I will analyze the Frankfurtian strategy confronting it with the Non-Reductive Physicalist account about mind. The goal is to show how Frankfurt, in trying to achieve some kind of plausibility, does not only makes use of the deterministic resources embodied in the counterexample, but also appeals to reader’s freedom experience as a kind of reflection that requires the presence of alternate possibilities.

The extended abstract is in

Acerca de Martin Montoya

I am Professor of Ethics and History of Contemporary Philosophy at the University of Navarra. Researching on theories of action of Maurice Blondel and Thomas Aquinas, the debate about the metaphysics of free will, moral & religious beliefs, and epistemology.
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